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country and should it be found that the revenue therefrom is
not what it should be, it is hoped that the legislature will provide
for proper enforcement of the tax rather than increase the rates
or extend the tax to transfers of property which are not now
subject to it.
SIDNEY A. CHAMPAGNE*
COMPUTATION OF THE LEGITIME WHEN ESTATE OF
DECEASED CONSISTS OF ASSETS IN SEVERAL STDATES
Limitations on freedom of testation are common in this coun-
try.' Provisions which reserve some portion of a decedent's
estate to the surviving spouse are found in some form in all states,
varying from the ancient institutions of dower and curtesy
to the idea of "forced portion" as provided by the Louisiana Civil
Code,2 or "hell-fire" statutes limiting a testator's freedom to leave
his estate to charity where he either is survived by close rela-
tives or attempts to make the charitable gift during his last ill-
ness.3
Two main types of statutes which restrict freedom of testa-
tion must be distinguished at this point: First, those statutes
which reserve an "indefeasible share" to "forced heirs,' 4 exem-
plified by Article 1493 of the Louisiana Civil Code;5 second, those
statutes which limit to a certain fraction of the estate the share
disposable by the testator either generally or in favor of certain
recipients, especially charities, but do not reserve any defeasible
share to specific members of the testator's family." The Califor-
nia "hell-fire" statute is a good illustration of the second type.7
That statute provides, in effect, that a testator who leaves certain
* Graduate of February 1950; presently member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. Kuhn, Comparative Commentaries on Private International Law
(1937) 333; Rheinstein, Cases on Decedent's Estates (1 ed. 1947) 403; Bres-
laur, Conflict of Laws in Restriction on Freedom of Testation (1942) 27 Iowa
L. Rev. 425, n. 3, 426 n. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
2. Arts. 1493, 1494, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1937) § 41.
4. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 439: "In contrast to the laws of
the Civil Law countries, the laws of the several states of the United States,
with the sole exception of Louisiana, do not grant an undefeasible share
to the descendants of a testator. However, American law has developed
some devices by which some measure of protection against disinheritance
is established for all, or for certain groups of, the descendants."
5. "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa can not exceed two-thirds
of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, a legitimate
child, one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he leaves three
or a greater number. .."
6. Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 172, 196-
198.
7. See note 3, supra.
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heirs cannot devise or bequeath more than one-third of his estate
to charity. The statute does not provide, however, that these
enumerated heirs will receive the other two-thirds of the estate.
Thus, a testator could validly devise one-third of his estate to
charity, and the remaining two-thirds to a stranger. The problem
raised by these statutes is one of computation of the disposable
fraction of the estate, and not the computation of the indefeasible
share reserved to forced heirs. It must be remembered, however,
that, in both types of restrictive statutes the fundamental pur-
pose is to protect the family of the deceased against disinherison.8
Upon the death of a person testate, there arises the problem
of determining how these various statutes apply to an estate
the assets of which are located in more than one state or coun-
try, and especially of how to compute the "indefeasible share"
of a protected member of the family or the "disposable share"
subject to the testator's free disposition.
Before dealing with this problem, certain preliminary obser-
vations should be made. With respect to statutes which restrict
dispositions in favor of charitable associations or corporations in
general, it is necessary that the purpose of the statute in question
be inquired into.9 Was it intended to limit the capacity of the
organizations enumerated in the statute to take, or was it in-
tended to place a restriction on the capacity of the testator to
give? Statutes of the former variety are referred to as mortmain
acts.'0 The history of the mortmain acts is interesting, but it
must suffice to observe that they were originally "aimed at the
prevention of the accumulation of too much wealth in the hands
of an economically powerful and, therefore, politically dangerous
organization..."" The Magna Charta of 1217 contained such a pro-
hibition directed at the Church. In the United States today mort-
main acts exist in various forms. In many cases gifts to corpora-
tions are prohibited unless exempted by the corporation charter
or the statutory law of the state. In other states gifts to chari-
table organizations are dependent upon governmental authoriza-
8. See note 4, supra.
9. Bordwell, supra note 6, at 194.
10. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 400: "Early in the Middle Ages,
the canonist lawyers of the Church had established the rule that church
lands, being devoted to the service of the Lord, could never return to tem-
poral ownership and were, therefore, to be inalienable. Under this doctrine,
the Church's land holdings could increase but never diminish, and land
that had once come to the Church had come to a 'dead hand' (manius,




tion. 12 In any case, however, the restriction is on the ability to
receive.13 Statutes which limit the freedom of the testator to
give must clearly be distinguished. Of course, in statutes which
reserve an indefeasible fraction to certain heirs no difficulty
arises, as the statute does not predicate the restriction upon the
nature of the legatee or devisee, but upon the natural relation-
ship of the heirs. The distinction must be kept in mind, however,
in relation to certain "hell fire" statutes which restrict disposition
to charitable, literary, scientific, religious, educational or mis-
sionary societies. These statutes also predicate upon the testa-
tor's having a husband, wife, parent, child or some other rela-
tion. It has been generally held that when the statute restricts
disposition when the testator leaves certain family relations, the
purpose of the statute is for the protection of these persons.14
Thus, such a statute restricts the freedom of the testator to give
and is not a restriction upon the capacity of the organizations
enumerated in the act to receive.
The principal problem under discussion is best presented
by means of a concrete illustration. Assume the following facts:
T, a widower, dies testate as a domiciliary of State Y. His
closest surviving relation is his daughter, Mary. In his will
he has bequeathed all of his personal property to his daugh-
ter and devised all of his real property to a local charity.
T has left the following net assets:
Immovables situated in State X worth $80,000
Immovables situated in State Y worth $60,000
Immovables situated in State Z worth $10,000
Movables situated in State X worth $40,000
Movables situated in State Y worth $20,000
Value of total net estate-$210,000
In State X there is a statute which provides as follows:
"Disposition by will and last testament cannot exceed one-
half of the estate of the testator if he leaves at his decease a
legitimate child or one-third if he leaves two or more legiti-
mate children."
No such statute is in effect in States Y or Z.
12. Ibid.
13. For further literature on mortmain acts see Hazeltine, Mortmain, 11
Enc. Soc. Sci. 40.
14. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 (Ct. App. 1871).
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Does the statute of X apply in the present case, and if so,
how does it affect the distribution of T's estate?
It is generally said that succession to immovables is deter-
mined by the law of the state of the situs and succession to mov-
ables by the law of the state of the decedent's domicile at the
time of his death. Numerous cases enunciate this rule,15 and
noted writers in the field of conflict of laws are generally in
accord. 16 The reason for applying the law of the situs (lex rei
sitae) to problems of succession to immovables is basically the
same one that calls for the application of the law of the situs
to all problems concerning title to immovables. Such problems
usually arise at the situs. If they are to be decided in some other
forum, that court applies the lex situs to bring about uniformity
of decision. In addition, it is a practical necessity for a title
examiner, in determining the legal effects of a title deed or any
other event that might possibly affect title, to have to look to
one and only one law. Obviously this law has to be the one of
the place where the land is and where the title deeds are re-
corded. 17 For the purposes of this comment, the reason for
this rule must be kept clearly in mind.
In answering the question of how statutes like that of
State X affect the distribution of a testator's estate, courts of the
situs of immovable assets have followed two or possibly three
main courses.
First, the indefeasible or disposable share may be computed
as a fraction of the assets subject to distribution under the lex
fori (that is, the lex situs), without regard to how much a forced
heir or charity may receive from other assets.' Following this
reasoning in applying the hypothetical statute of X, which
reserves an indefeasible share to the forced heir, a court of X
15. Succession of Senac, 2 Rob. 258 (La. 1842); Succession of Robert,
2 Rob. 427 (La. 1842); Succession of Pachwood, 9 Rob. 438 (La. 1845); Hughes
v. Hughes, 14 La. Ann. 85 (1859); Estate of Lewis, 32 La. Ann. 385 (1880);
Succession of Bysdale, 121 La. 816, 46 So. 873 (1908); Succession of Herber,
128 La. 111, 54 So. 579 (1911); Succession of Harris, 179 La. 954, 155 So. 446
(1934); Larned v. Larned, 98 Kan. 328, 158 Pac. 3 (1916); Humphries v. Settle-
meyer, 91 S.C. 389, 74 S.E. 892 (1912). But see Estate of Lathrop, 165 Cal.
243, 131 Pac. 752 (1913) which held that both personal and real property in
the state of California are governed by the laws of California, although
domicile of testator at time of his death was New York.
16. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 306.4 (p. 1036) 249.1 (p. 969);
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942) 252;
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (6 ed. 1949) 529, Rule 127; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (3 ed. 1949) §§ 167, 168; 4 Page, Wills (3 ed. 1941) § 1643 (p. 713).
17. Cook, op. cit. supra note 16, at 427.
18. Breslaur, op. cit. supra note 1, at 429.
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would make the following computation: The daughter Mary is
entitled to one-half of the value of the immovable assets in X,
regardless of the fact that she had been bequeathed personal
property worth $60,000 out of the estate elsewhere. The Louisi-
ana case of Estate of Lewis"9 has been cited as an example of
this method of computation. In that case a Mississippi testatrix
had favored one of her daughters as universal legatee. She left
considerable immovable property in Louisiana. The other de-
scendants (forced heirs) of the deceased brought an action in
Louisiana seeking reduction to the extent of their forced portion.
The supreme court said: "As regards her movable property, the
effect of Mrs. Butler's donation is to be regulated by the laws of
Mississippi; and to determine the reduction to which said dona-
tion is liable under the laws of Louisiana, an aggregate must be
formed of exclusively the property and things or of the proceeds
of the sale of the property and things which she owned in this
state at the time of her death, and which-at that date and under
our laws-were immovable... and-this aggregate formed-by
deducting therefrom the portion reserved to the forced heirs of
the deceased.'20 The Louisiana court clearly states that only the
immovable property in Louisiana will form the aggregate upon
which the forced portion is computed. However, at no point
does the court conclude that the forced heir would be entitled
to that fraction irrespective of what was received by him out of
the total estate elsewhere. There was no necessity for such a
conclusion in the Lewis case, as the forced heirs had in fact re-
ceived nothing from the testatrix. Several other decisions have
been cited corroborating the Lewis decision and the fact that con-
sideration will not be given to what the heir receives outside
19. 32 La. Ann. 385 (1880).
20. 32 La. Ann. 385, 389 (1880). The court further noted the second para-
graph of Art. 491, La. Civil Code of 1870. "Persons who reside out of the
state, can not dispose of the property they possess here, in a manner differ-
ent from that prescribed by its laws." The only exception to this rule is to
be found in Art. 10, La. Civil Code of 1870, which states: "The form and
effect of public and private written instruments are governed by the laws
and usages of the places where they are passed or executed.
'But the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in another
country, is regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have
effect.
"The exception made in the second paragraph of this article does not
hold, when a citizen of another State of the Union, or a citizen or subject
of a foreign State or country, disposes by will or testament, or by any
other act causa mortis made of this State, of his movable property situated
in this State, if at the time of making said will or testament, or any other
act causa mortis, and at the time of his death, he resides and is domiciliated
out of this State." '
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of the state.21 In all these cases, however, the heir who was seek-
ing the reserved share had received nothing from the estate. A
more reasonable conclusion from the cases would be that the
court of the situs might hold that the forced share is the pre-
scribed fraction of the immovable assets at the situs irrespective
of what the heir receives out of the total estate elsewhere. It
is presumptuous to conclude that this rule is settled by the juris-
prudence when the cases reviewed do not involve the factual
situation of the heirs receiving such benefits elsewhere. 22
Under the reasoning just discussed the bequest of the per-
sonal property amounting to $60,000 to the daughter, Mary,
would be disregarded.
A second method of computing the indefeasible or disposable
share has been argued. It has been said that this bequest ought
to be considered in order to determine whether the daughter
has received as much as the law of X wishes her to receive; that
is, one-half of the estate. If, for the purposes of the law of State
X, the "estate" is regarded to consist exclusively of the land
located there and valued at $80,000, by receiving a legacy of
$60,000 Mary has been given more than one-half of the "estate,"
and the entire devise of the X land to the charity would thus be
upheld. An illustration of this method of computation is pro-
vided by the case of Jarel v. Moon's Succession.23 The testatrix
died as a domiciliary of Iowa, leaving a total estate of roughly
$9,000. She had bequeathed $1,000 to her only daughter and
appointed her niece as residuary legatee. The testatrix had
owned real estate in Louisiana worth $500. The daughter brought
suit in Louisiana, asking to be awarded one-third of the entire
estate of the deceased as her forced portion under the laws of
Louisiana, and, in the alternative, to be awarded one-third of the
immovable property situated in Louisiana. The court of appeal
dismissed her first demand by stating ". . . the courts of this state
will only attempt to regulate the effect of the will of Mrs. Moon
insofar as it affects the immovable property within this state. '24
As to the alternative demand of the plaintiff to acquire one-third
21. Note (1940) 14 Tulane L. R. 313, 315, cites the following cases on this
point. Hughes v. Hughes, 14 La. Ann. 85 (1859); Banker's Trust Co. v.
Greims, 110 Conn. 36, 147 At]. 290 (1929).
22. It must be remembered that what the forced heir receives outside
Louisiana need not be a legacy. It could be an interest in the estate which
the heir has received under similar protective statutes either in the domi-
ciliary administration or other ancillary administrations.
23. 190 So. 867 (La. App. 1939).
24. Id. at 869.
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of the immovable property in Louisiana, the court said: "As far
as the property located in this state was concerned, the plaintiff
was not aggrieved, as she received a far greater amount than
the one-third reserved to her under the laws- of this state. ' 25
The court reasoned that to include property outside the state in
the computation of the estate would be creating a dilemma, as
courts in all states where immovable property is situated would
attempt to administer the entire estate of the deceased without
regard to the domiciliary law.26 In many cases such attempted
administration would be fruitless for the simple reason that the
value of the immovable property in the forum could be less than
the portion reserved to the heir by the law of the forum. At
the same time the court could not justifiably ignore the fact
that the heir had received out of the total estate an amount
greater than the value of his forced portion in the Louisiana
immovables. The Jarel decision has been criticized as a depar-
ture from the jurisprudence of the Louisiana courts. 27 The
opinion was advanced that either "all the property" of the de-
ceased be considered in computing the forced portion, or "only
the gifts and the estate in Louisiana" should be recognized.28 It
is submitted that none of the cases cited in criticism as the sound
jurisprudence of Louisiana 29 dealt with the situation presented
in the Jarel decision; that is, the receipt of gifts by the heir
outside Louisiana. The Jarel decision is, therefore, not contradic-
tory, but supplementary.
A third method of computing the portion reserved under the
restrictive statute differs greatly from the previous two meth-
ods. The court of State X may consider the entire estate of T,
wherever located, as comprising the "estate." There is no dis-
tinction made between immovable and movable assets in arriv-
ing at this aggregate. In taking cognizance of the property out-
side of State X, however, the court also considers gifts or bene-
fits which the heir has received in other jurisdictions. The court
of X will consider the estate of T as amounting to $210,000. Ap-
plying the statute the court computes that Mary should receive
the sum of $105,000, that is, the one-half provided in the statute.
Since Mary has already received $60,000 in specific bequests,
she will be awarded the sum of $45,000 out of the immovable
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Note (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 313.
28. Id. at 315.
29. See Note 21, supra.
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assets in X. The remainder of the assets in X ($35,000) will be
available for the devise to the charity. In the Texas case of
Paschal v. Acklin ° such computation was adopted by the court.
The testator died as domiciliary of Tennessee, leaving immovable
assets in Texas. A Texas statute provided that a testator could
not dispose of more than three-fourths of his estate if he had
children surviving him. The statute was similar to the hypo-
thetical statute of State X in that the child was reserved an
indefeasible share of the estate. The court was clear in pointing
out that, if the children of the testator had received nothing from
the total estate of the deceased elsewhere, the Texas statute
would be applied and the children would be awarded out of the
Texas assets, an amount equal to one-fourth of the entire estate
of the deceased. The children of the deceased, however, had
received legacies of property in other states, and the court found
these legacies to be equivalent to one-fourth of the total estate.
The court said, "The object of the law is to secure to children
a just and reasonable portion of their parent's estate. If they
received the portion to which the law declared they were en-
titled, it was immaterial where or in what way they received
it."3 1 It is interesting to observe in the Paschal decision that the
court attributed absolutely no importance to the fact that the
testator had been domiciled in Tennessee rather than in Texas.
The jurisprudence of California supplies other excellent
examples of computing a disposable portion on the basis of the
entire estate of the deceased, although neither the domicile of the
decedent nor the major part of the estate was in California. 32
The California statute was not one which reserved an inde-
feasible portion to certain heirs, but it limited disposition to
charitable organizations to one-third of the decedent's estate.
Nevertheless, the cases point out the application of a restrictive
statute by the court of the situs to the entire estate of the de-
ceased. In Estate of Dwyer,3' a Louisiana testatrix had left the
bulk of her estate to a Louisiana charity. In an ancillary admin-
istration in California, where certain immovable assets were
located, the heirs invoked the California statute which limited
disposition of decedent's estates to one-third of the "estate"
30. 27 Tex. 173 (1863).
31. Id. at 196.
32. Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911); Estate of Lathrop,
165 Cal. 243, 131 Pac. 752 (1913); Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482, 253 Pac. 921
(1927); Estate of Layton, 217 Cal. 451, 19 P.(2d) 793 (1933).
33. 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911).
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when such disposition was made to charity (contingent also on
the existence of certain "heirs at law"). The value of the im-
movable property in California was less than one-tenth of the
entire estate. The court, however, in computing the one-third
which was disposable, considered the entire estate of the testa-
trix. Speaking of the legislative intent in interpreting the stat-
ute, the court said, ". . . there is no reason why it should be held
that the estate of the testator mentioned therein, of which a
limited disposition to charity may be made, means the estate
of the testator distributable alone in this state. On the contrary,
as the legislative intent was only to prevent a disposition in
excess of one-third of the estate of the testator where he left
heirs at law. ' '3 4 The case was remanded to the lower court for
purposes of actual computation based on the aggregate of the
entire estate.
In the New York case of Decker v. Vreeland35 a local statute
was applied by the court of the situs of immovables to the will
of a testator who had died as a domiciliary of New Jersey. The
New York statute provided that a testator could not give more
than one-half of his "estate" to charity when he was survived
by a husband, wife, child or parent. It is similar to the California
statute; it restricts the freedom of testation by establishing a
disposable limit, but does not give an indefeasible share to the
heirs. The will of the testator left practically the entire estate
to charity. Only about one-third of the estate's assets were in
New York. The New York court said, "There can be little doubt
that in determining the testator's estate all his property, both
real and personal, and wheresoever situated, must be taken into
consideration. '36 It is submitted that courts which adopt this
line of reasoning, when the intention of the statute is not ex-
plicit to that effect, are imputing a meaning to their statutes
which is clearly not there. Simply because immovable assets
are situated in the state, these courts have assumed the obliga-
tion of protecting the interests of the decedent's family by com-
34. 159 Cal. 680, 689, 115 Pac. 242, 245 (1911).
35. 220 N.Y. 326 (App. Div. 1917).
36. Id. at 335. The court then described the actual computation as
follows: "Applying this rule to the case at bar we have the following
(using round figures): The entire estate over debts of the testator, includ-
ing the New York property is $140,000; $70,000 of it can go to charity. If
the North New Jersey Baptist Association has received $70,000 of the estate
in New Jersey, it cannot have any part of the New York real estate, which
will then go to the heirs of the testator. If the Association has received
but $50,000 it can share in the New York real estate to the extent of $20,000
and no more." (Id. at 336.)
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puting under the local law exactly how much of the entire estate
is subject to disposition. This position rapidly reaches the ridicu-
lous when the case of a man owning oil land in, for example,
California, is considered. He has made this purchase merely for
investment. He has never been to California. His entire family
lives with him in Maine, where they have always lived. Upon
his death the entire tenor of his will may be destroyed because
the California court will assume the task of protecting the heirs
of the deceased on the basis of the California law and will con-
sider the entire estate of the deceased as a necessary basis for
computing the degree of protection. Although the California
court can make use of only the immovable property situated in
California in effecting its computation, it is difficult to compre-
hend how the facts of such a case give the California court justi-
fication for assuming the task of protecting the Maine family by
the laws of California. The only connection the state of Cali-
fornia has with the problem of descent and distribution of the
decedent's estate appears to be the fact that immovable property
is situated in California. If the statute of California is to be
applied at all, it should apply so as to compute the share subject
to free disposition merely as a fraction of the value of the assets
subject to the California law of descent, that is, the California
immovables. To do otherwise is to project the effect of the law
of the situs to the general problem of descent and distribution
of the estate of a non-resident testator, thus ignoring the law of
the decedent's domicile. It is difficult to imagine that any legis-
lature might ever knowingly intend to bring about such a result.
Application by the court of the situs of the three approaches
discussed above has given rise to related problems in the course
of the domiciliary administration. In the English case of In Re
Ogilvie, 7 the testatrix died while domiciled in England. She had
made certain special bequests of personal property to some of her
heirs, and had devised a large amount of real property situated
in Paraguay to charity. The heirs obtained four-fifths of the
Paraguayan property in a Paraguayan court by invoking the law
of the situs, which provided that only one-fifth of the estate of
a testator could be bequeathed or devised to charity. In admin-
istration proceedings in England those of the heirs who were
named in the will claimed the full amount of their legacies. The
Chancellor held that the claimants could not simultaneously
claim under the will in England and.against it in Paraguay, and
37. [1918] 1 Ch. Div. 492.
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thus conditioned their claim to the legacies upon their paying
over to the charitable legatees the value of the share in the
Paraguayan lands obtained by them in the Paraguayan proceed-
ings. Thus, the English court in the domiciliary administration
nullified the effect of the application of the law of the situs by
putting the English heirs to their election. A strikingly similar
case arose in Vermont. In that case, In Re Lawrence's Will,38
the decedent had been domiciled in Vermont. He had made
legacies to certain of his heirs, and devised the remainder of his
estate to charity. The heirs brought suit in California urging a
California statute which limited disposition to charitable insti-
tutions to one-third of the estate of the testator. As there was
immovable property in California, the heirs were successful in
obtaining from the California assets two-thirds of the value of
the entire estate of the testator. The California court had ob-
viously followed the doctrine of Estate of Dwyer"9 in making
this computation. Later, in the domiciliary administration in
Vermont these same heirs claimed the amount of their legacies
under the will. The Vermont court, citing In Re Ogilvie,40 con-
ditioned the upholding of these special legacies upon the lega-
tees' paying the disappointed charity the exact sum which the
California court had stricken from the devise. It is suggested
that both of these cases present the same fundamental purpose-
the application of the law of the decedent's last domicile by
utilizing the doctrine of election to correct the erroneous appli-
cation of the law of the situs. In the course of other domiciliary
administrations several courts have expressed the view that
statutes restricting testation should be applied only to domicil-
iaries of the state which has enacted that statute. In a Pennsyl-
vania case, Thompson v. Swoop e, 41 a testator domiciled in Penn-
sylvania devised his entire estate to charity. One of these chari-
table organizations was chartered in New York. All of the
estate of the deceased was located in Pennsylvania. The heir
of the deceased sought to invoke a New York statute which
prevented disposition of more than one-half of the estate. After
pointing out that the New York statute was not a mortmain act,
the Pennsylvania court further observed, "The statute was in-
tended to regulate the testamentary power of their own citizens,
38. 93 Vt. 424, 108 At. 387 (1919).
39. 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911).
40. [1918) 1 Ch. Div. 492.
41. 24 Pa. 474 (1855).
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not of ours.4 2 Under identical facts the Connecticut court in
Crum v. Bliss43 stated, ". . . it [the New York Statute] cannot
affect testators who at the time of their death were domiciled in
other states. '44
The analysis of the cases discussed indicates the proper so-
lution of our hypothetical case. In problems arising in ancillary
administration or in other proceedings at the state of the situs,
why apply the protective statute of the situs at all? As we have
seen, the fundamental purpose of a statute limiting freedom of
testation in the manner indicated is to protect the families of
decedents dying domiciled within the state. Therefore, no state
should apply any protective statute other than that of the state
of the decedent's last domicile. Ordinarily the protective statutes
of the state of the decedent's last domicile should be applied
only in the domiciliary administration proceedings. To this gen-
eral rule there is but one necessary exception: Security of land
titles requires that every state where immovables are located
disregard the provisions of the domiciliary law and apply its
own provisions. 45 But, if the provisions of the protective statute
in the state where the immovable assets are located do not give
the forced heir a direct share in the estate or a direct interest
in the land, but only give that heir a claim against the bene-
ficiaries of the will, there is no question of title involved, and
hence no necessity of invoking the exception to the general rule.
It has been clearly held that when there is no question of title
to land or part of the estate, the court will not hesitate to look
to the law of the decedent's last domicile although the problem
presented to the court is directly concerned with the immovable
estate of the deceased.46 Whether or not the restrictive statute
which the court of the situs is called upon to interpret is one
which affects title to the immovable assets, or one which merely
was intended to give a claim against the beneficiaries of the will,
is a problem of local law. A New York statute, for example,
which is similar to the California "hell-fire" statute, has been
interpreted as immediately vesting one-half of the estate in the
protected heirs.47 A similar statute of California might well be
interpreted as giving a direct interest in the estate to the pro-
42. Id. at 475.
43. 47 Conn. 592 (1880).
44. Id. at 600.
45. Cook, op. cit. supra note 16, at 253.
46. Higginbotham v. Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 154 AtI. 242, 79 A.L.R. 85
(1931).
47. In re De Lamar's Estate, 192 N.Y. Supp. 412 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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tected heirs. The Louisiana forced heirship provision is another
example of testamentary restrictions which directly affect title
to the immovable property in Louisiana.4 In the case of com-
mon law dower and curtesy a direct interest in the land is
created in favor of the surviving spouse.49 All such restrictive
statutes deal directly with questions of title to the immovable
property in the state. It is necessary that they be applied to
this property to preserve the security of land titles in the state.
In no case, however, should the court of the situs consider any
more than the immovable property in the state in computing
the fraction which the statute reserves to the heirs. To do so
would be to project the local law which is necessarily applied
for the purpose of security of title to the entire problem of de-
scent and distribution of the estate of a non-resident testator.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the statute which
restricts testation is designed merely to afford the pretermittal
heir to a claim against the beneficiaries of the will. Such is the
purpose of Section 2303 of the German Civil Code. 0 The Eng-
lish Family Provision Act of 1938 might also be interpreted as
a statute which merely provides for a money payment from the
estate for the benefit of certain neglected members of the testa-
tor's family. 1 When such interpretation can be placed upon the
statute, there is no question of title to immovable property in-
volved, and, consequently, no necessity to apply the statute to
immovable property of a testator who had died domiciled in
another state. Thus, in our example case, if the court of State
X were to interpret the X statute as providing for only a money
claim against the beneficiaries and involving no questions of
title, the court could justifiably refuse to apply the statute of X
at all, and relegate the questions of succession under the will to
the law of the decedent's last domicile, State Y.
It is suggested that when a court sitting at the situs of the
immovable assets is confronted with a statute expressed in gen-
eral terms which imposes restrictions on the capacity of a testa-
48. Arts. 1492, 1493, 940, 941, La. Civil Code of 1870.
49. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (7 ed. 1775).
50. Art. 2303, B.G.B. "If a descendant of a testator is excluded from
succession by disposition mortis causa, he may demand his compulsory por-
tion from the heir. The compulsory portion is equal to one-half of the
statutory portion (h).
"The same rights belong to the parents and spouse of the testator, if
they have been excluded from succession by a disposition mortis causa
51. See Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 465-472. This act is expressly limited
to testators dying domiciled in England.
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tor to dispose of his estate, it should ask itself whether the
statute was intended to lay down a restriction affecting title
to immovable property in the state or whether it was intended
to lay down a policy for restricting freedom of testation of per-
sons domiciled within the state. In the first case, where title is
affected, the statute must apply to the immovable assets in the
state no matter where the testator was domiciled; but in the
second case, as no title to the assets within the state are affected
by the statute, the statute should not apply to the estate of the
deceased who has died domiciled in another state.5 2 Such an
approach would relegate problems of the decedent's estate to
the most appropriate law-the law of the decedent's last domi-
cile, which can frequently undo any disposition made by any
law of any state where immovables are located, by compelling
the beneficiaries of these laws to pay back to the estate the value
of the benefit received in the other state.
WILLIAM F. WILSON, JR.
52. Cf. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (6 ed. 1949) § 31.
[VOL. X538
